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Abstract
Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have
recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral con-
tracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its ro-
bustness by introducing competition between agents. We find that communication and
competition act as “substitutes:” communication raises efficiency in the absence of com-
petition but lowers efficiency with competition, and competition raises efficiency without
communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behav-
ioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some
but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of
cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that efficient contracting may be hampered by adverse selection problems
that arise when outputs depend on privately known talents or types. Besides an impressive
theoretical literature that addresses the design of optimal contracts in the presence of adverse
selection (see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005), alternative solutions based on insights from
behavioral economics and laboratory experiments have recently been proposed (see, for instance,
Fehr et al., 2007). In particular, experimental studies have demonstrated that “cheap talk,” i.e.
non-binding and costless communication, can enhance efficiency (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006, 2011) and can be more effective than monetary incentives (Brandts and Cooper, 2007).
Plausible explanations that have been put forth are that cheap talk messages contain implicit
promises that are costly to break when agents get disutility from lying (Vanberg, 2008) or from
letting others down (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009).
Much of this recent literature, however, focuses on bilateral relationships between a single
principal and a single agent. This is obviously different from many real-world settings, e.g.
when multiple job applicants compete for a single job (especially in times of a recession).
It is conceivable that competition will change the nature of the messages exchanged, or the
propensity with which promises are kept. In addition, implicit promises may have less impact
when a principal receives similar messages from more than one agent. It is, therefore, natural
to ask whether cheap-talk communication is still effective in promoting efficient contracting
when competition exists.
To address this question, we vary the possibility of communication in the one-shot principle-
agent game studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) and in an extension where the principle
selects one of two agents before playing the game. This variation of the game defines our com-
petition treatments.1 Our experiment replicates the main finding of Charness and Dufwenberg
(2011). We find that in the “no-competition” treatments, communication raises efficiency. We
also find that in the “no-communication” treatments, competition raises efficiency. Thus, by
themselves, communication and competition positively affect efficiency. However, compared to
treatments with competition or communication only, efficiency is lower in a treatment with
both communication and competition. In other words, competition and communication act
as substitutes. Communication raises efficiency without competition but lowers efficiency with
competition. Likewise, competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers effi-
ciency with communication.
1Stigler (1987, p. 531) defines competition as “a rivalry between individuals ... that arises whenever two or
more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain.” Our design captures the essence of this definition.
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We discuss the extent to which several recently proposed behavioral models can explain
the observed comparative statics patterns. We find that lie aversion (Vanberg, 2008), guilt
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011), inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) all capture some but not all features of the data. We expressly do
not propose an alternative theory. Rather we hope our novel empirical findings will stimulate
further theoretical work in this exciting area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental
design based on the principle-agent game with hidden information. In Section 3 we report
the effects of communication and competition. We also correlate messages with outcomes to
provide additional insights into behavior. Section 4 briefly discusses several behavioral theories.
Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains the instructions for the experiment.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. A Simple Principal-Agent Game
The experiment employs simple variations of the principal-agent game with hidden information
as proposed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). The principal needs to hire an agent to
complete a project, which can be either a simple project at a wage of 14, or a difficult project
at a wage of 20. Agents can be either of “Low” type (with probability 2/3) or of “High”
type (with probability 1/3). Both types of agents can complete the simple project while only
the high-type agent can successfully complete the difficult project. The contract cannot be
conditioned on the agent’s type, which is private information; the principal only knows the ex
ante probabilities that an agent is of low or high type.
The game tree is summarized in Figure 1.2 If the principal chooses not to hire (“Out”) then
both the principal and the agent get their outside-option payoffs of 10. When the principal
chooses to hire (“In”) the outcome depends on who accepts the difficult project. If a low-type
agent selects the difficult project (“Roll”) then he fails and the principal gets 0. If a high-type
agent selects the difficult project then in the with-die-roll (“WDR”) version of the game the
project is completed successfully with probability 5/6 and the principal receives 24, otherwise
the principal gets nothing. In the no-die-roll (“NDR”) version of the game the principal gets
(the expected value) 20 for sure. (These two versions are introduced to test different models of
guilt, as explained in Section 4 below.) Finally, if the simple project is selected (“Don’t Roll”)
2We doubled the payoffs in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to make the monetary incentives more salient.
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Figure 1. A principal-agent game with hidden information. In the no-die-
roll (“NDR”) version piP = 20 for sure while in the with-die-roll (“WDR”)
version piP = 24 with probability 5/6 and piP = 0 with probability 1/6.
by either type of agent then the principal receives 14.
Socially optimal contracts are possible when information is complete, i.e. when the contract
can be conditioned on the agent’s type. In this case, the principal hires a low-type agent to
complete the simple project or a high-type agent to complete the difficult project. It will be
useful to compare the outcomes observed in the experiment to this efficient benchmark.
Definition. The efficient outcomes are (“In”, “Don’t Roll”) when the agent is of low type and
(“In”, “Roll”) when the agent is of high type. All other outcomes are inefficient.
When contracts are efficient, the ex ante expected payoffs are readily computed to be 16 for the
principal and 16 for the agent. These payoffs are higher than those that result when contracts
cannot be conditioned on the agent’s private information. With selfish agents, the prediction
is that both low-type and high-type agents will choose “Roll,” and, hence, the best response
for the principal is to choose “Out,” resulting in payoffs of 10 for both the principal and the
agent.3 The setting of Figure 1 therefore captures the adverse selection problem that hinders
efficient contracting (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).
2.2. Design and Procedures
Table 1 summarizes the different treatments of the experiment, which vary by whether or not
there is agent competition (group size two or three), whether or not communication is allowed
(“C” or “NC”), and whether or not the principal’s payoff when a high-type agent chooses
3Choosing “In” yields an expected payoff of only 1/3× 5/6× 24 = 20/3 for the principal.
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Treatment Competition Communication Channel Group Size # of Groups # of Subjects
2NC-WDR No none 2 24 48
2C-WDR No B → A 2 24 48
2NC-NDR No none 2 25 50
2C-NDR No B → A 2 23 46
3NC-WDR Yes none 3 24 72
3C-WDR Yes B1 → A, B2 → A 3 37 111
Table 1. The experimental design varies whether there is competition between agents and whether
one-sided communication from the agent(s) to the principle is possible. In addition, in the no-
competition treatments the principal’s payoff is 20 for sure in the no-die-roll treatments and it is
24 with chance 5/6 and zero otherwise in the with-die-roll treatments.
“Roll” is uncertain (“NDR” or “WDR”). Communication is one-way, e.g. in “2C-NDR” or
“2C-WDR” the agent can send free-form messages to the principal but not vice versa. In the
no-competition treatments with group size equal to two the principal is paired with a single
agent while in the competition treatments with a group size of three there is an additional
agent. In the competition treatments the principal has to select one of the two agents prior
to playing the game shown in Figure 1. The agent that is not selected receives a low payoff
of 5. In “3C-WDR” both agents can send free-form messages to the principal to influence the
principal’s selection while this is not possible in treatment “3NC-WDR”. Communication is
again one-way so that agents cannot observe or influence each other’s messages.
We recruited a total of 375 subjects from the University of Zu¨rich and the neighboring
ETH. The sessions without communication typically took about half an hour and the sessions
with communication took about an hour, including the instruction and payment phases. The
reason that the experiments were quick is that there was only a single period of play. Average
earnings were 23 CHF including a 10 CHF show-up fee at an exchange rate of roughly 1 CHF
for $1. The experimental instructions closely follow those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011),
see Appendix A.4
3. Results
We first discuss the aggregate outcomes in the different treatments and then provide an analysis
of the messages that were sent in the communication treatments.
4One difference is that our experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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3.1. Outcomes
We start by comparing the outcomes of our no-competition treatments (with group size two) to
those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to check whether we replicate their findings. The left
and middle panels of Figure 2 show the fraction of “In” choices made by the principal and the
fraction of “Don’t Roll” choices made by the low-type agent respectively. We do not separately
show the percentage of “Roll” choices for the high-type agents, which, like in the Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011) study, was 100% in all treatments. Each panel shows the results for the with-
die-roll (“WDR”) and no-die-roll (“NDR”) treatments separately and combined (“Pooled”) as
well as the results from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study (labeled “C&D”). For
each data set, the left bar (“NC”) pertains to the no-communication treatment and the right
bar (“C”) to the communication treatment. The right panel in Figure 2 shows the predicted
fraction of efficient outcomes based on the choice data and, in the communication treatments,
the messages sent. We use the predicted rather than the observed fraction of efficient outcomes
to correct for any differences in outcomes unrelated to the subjects’ decisions.5
As can be seen from Figure 2, the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll” rates, and predicted percentages
of efficient outcomes are very similar for the “NDR” and “WDR” treatments, whether or not
communication is allowed. Furthermore, they are all similar to the corresponding rates for the
Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study. Indeed, formal statistical tests reveal no significant
differences (at the 10%-level) for either the “In” rate, “Don’t Roll” rate, or the predicted
percentage of efficient outcomes with or without communication.6
Finding 1. Our no-competition treatments replicate the results of Charness and Dufwenberg
(2011) for both the communication and no-communication treatments.
Finding 2. The no-die-roll and with-die-roll treatments yield identical results for both the
communication and no-communication treatments.
Since there are no significant differences between the “NDR” and “WDR” treatments we will
5For instance, agents’ types were randomly determined by the program and the fraction of high-type agents
varied from 28.6% to 41.7% across treatments. To correct for this variability, the predicted fraction of efficient
outcomes, pIn( 13 +
2
3p
DR), uses the ex ante probabilities for each type. Here pIn denotes the principal’s “In”
rate and pDR the low-agent’s “Don’t Roll” rate. In the communication treatments, the “In” and “Don’t Roll”
rates may depend on the agent’s message, m, which, in turn, may depend on the agent’s type. The predicted
fraction of efficient outcomes now becomes
∑
m p
In(m)( 13PH(m) +
2
3PL(m)p
DR(m)) where PL(m) and PH(m)
are the probabilities that a low-type or high-type agent sends message m respectively. See Section 3.2 for a
more detailed discussion and an extension to the case with agent competition.
6More specifically, a two-sided proportion test shows no significant difference at the 10% level between the
“In” rates in “NDR” vs “WDR”, “NDR” vs “C&D”, “WDR” vs “C&D”, and “pooled” vs “C&D.” The same
no-difference result holds for the “Don’t Roll” rate and the percentage of efficient outcomes.
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Figure 2. The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the
right panel the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for the no-competition treatments. In each
panel, the “NC” bar refers to the no-communication treatment and the “C” bar to the communication
treatment. The data from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the
data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments are labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The
“Pooled” data represent the combined data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments.
consider only the pooled data in the remainder of this section. To avoid confusion, we drop the
“NDR” and “WDR” labels and refer to the pooled data from the two-person communication
treatments as “2C” and to those from the no-communication treatments as “2NC.” Figure 3
shows the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll” rates, and percentage of efficient outcomes for these pooled
data sets and the corresponding rates for the competition treatments, which are now labeled
“3NC” and “3C.”7
Note that the three panels of Figure 3 show a similar pattern: the “In” rate, the “Don’t
Roll” rate, and the percentage of efficient outcomes are high for the “2C” and “3NC” treatments
and low for the “2NC” and “3C” treatments. Importantly, Figure 3 shows that competition
raises efficiency without communication but it lowers efficiency with communication.8 Likewise,
communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but it lowers efficiency with
competition.9 In other words, communication and competition act as “substitutes.”
Finding 3. Communication raises efficiency without competition but lowers efficiency with
competition.
Finding 4. Competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with
communication.
7The “In” rate, “Don’t Roll” rate, and predicted percentage of efficient outcomes are (26/49, 7/20, 30.1%)
for treatment 2NC, (41/47, 17/28, 64.4%) for treatment 2C, (19/24, 7/11, 60.0%) for treatment 3NC, and
(22/37, 6/12, 37.5%) for treatment 3C.
8A two-sided proportion test shows that the predicted percentage of efficient outcomes is higher in “3NC”
than in “2NC” (p = 0.0143). However, the percentage of efficient outcomes is lower in “3C” than “2C”
(p = 0.0142).
9A two-sided proportion test shows that the predicted percentage of efficient outcomes is higher in “2C” than
in “2NC” (p = 0.0008). However, the percentage of efficient outcomes is lower in “3C” than “3NC” (p = 0.0852).
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Figure 3. The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the
right panel the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for all treatments.
This substitute relationship may result from the fact that competition affects the messages sent
or the extent to which the principal relies on the messages, or possibly both. To explore this
issue, we next provide a detailed analysis of the messages exchanged in the different treatments.
3.2. Messages
The coding of the free-form messages sent in our experiments follows the classification scheme
used by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). In particular, we focus on three basic message types:
“NP” for no promise, “LD” when a low-type agent discloses her type and promises to choose
“Don’t Roll,” and “HR” when a high-type agent discloses her type and promises to choose
“Roll.”10
Table 2 provides an overview of the messages sent by each agent type in our no-competition
treatments and compares them with those from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study.
In each box in Table 2, the row labeled “Total” shows the total number of times each message
was used, while the percentage below the box expresses this as a frequency. Using the Fisher’s
exact test reveals no significant differences (at the 10% level) between the “NDR” and “WDR”
messages nor are there significant differences between the pooled messages and the messages
from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study.
Finding 5. The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in our commu-
nication treatment without competition are not significantly different from those observed by
Charness and Dufwenberg (2011).
10As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) most, but not all, messages can be captured with this coding scheme.
Other types of messages are “L” when a low-type agent only discloses her type with no promise about the action
she will take, “R” when the agent only promises to “Roll” without disclosing her type, “H” when the agent
claims to be of high type with no promise about the action, and “DR” when the agent promises to choose
“Don’t Roll” without disclosing her type. The first two messages were classified as “NP,” the third message as
“HR” and the fourth message as “LD.”
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NP LD HR Total NP LD HR Total
Out 4 1 0 5 Out 2 2 1 5
In, R 0 0 5 5 In, R 4 2 5 11
In, DR 4 13 1 18 In, DR 3 13 1 17
Total 8 14 6 28 Total 9 17 7 33
28.6% 50.0% 21.4% 100.0% 27.3% 51.5% 21.2% 100.0%
Out 2 0 1 3 Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 0 2 8 10 In, R 1 0 12 13
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 9 13 Total 1 0 13 14
15.4% 15.4% 69.2% 100.0% 7.1% 0.0% 92.9% 100.0%
NP LD HR Total NP LD HR Total
Out 1 0 1 2 Out 1 2 0 3
In, R 1 2 2 5 In, R 3 0 3 6
In, DR 2 5 1 8 In, DR 1 8 0 9
Total 4 7 4 15 Total 5 10 3 18
26.7% 46.7% 26.7% 100.0% 27.8% 55.6% 16.7% 100.0%
Out 0 0 0 0 Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 1 0 8 9 In, R 0 0 4 4
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 8 9 Total 0 0 5 5
11.1% 0.0% 88.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C & D (2010)
Low
High
2C-WDR
Low
High
High
2C (pooled)
Low
High
2C-NDR
Low
Table 2. Messages and outcomes in the communication treatments without competition. The data
from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the data from the with-
die-roll and no-die-roll treatments are labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The “Pooled” data
represent the combined data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments.
Finding 6. The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in the no-die-roll
and with-die-roll communication treatments without competition are not significantly different.
Table 2 also lists the resulting outcomes by message and agent type. A test of our coding
scheme is whether the messages capture everything that the principal knows about the agent,
i.e. whether, conditional on the message, the principal’s choice is independent of the agent’s
type. Using a simple proportion test reveals that, conditional on the message received, there are
no significant differences (at the 10% level) between the principal’s “In” rate when the message
is sent by a low or a high-type agent. This is true for the “2C-NDR” and “2C-WDR” messages
as well as for the pooled messages and the messages from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011)
study.
We next compare the messages from the pooled no-competition treatments (labeled “2C”)
with those from the competition treatment (“3C”), see the top panels of Table 3. First, with
or without competition, messages sent by low-type agents differ significantly from those sent
by high-type agents.11 Moreover, messages differ significantly between the no-competition and
11The Fisher exact test yields p < 0.001 for treatment “2C” and p = 0.010 for treatment “3C.”
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2C NP LD HR Total 3C NP LD HR Total
Low 9 17 7 33 Low 24 16 13 53
High 1 0 13 14 High 8 1 12 21
Total 10 17 20 47 Total 32 17 25 74
In 8/10 15/17 18/20 41/47 In 3/9 5/10 14/18 22/37
DR 3/7 13/15 1/6 17/28 DR 0/1 5/5 1/6 6/12
Select Low 18.2% 34.3% 14.1% 66.6% Select Low 20.1% 22.3% 21.9% 64.3%
Select High 2.4% 0.0% 31.0% 33.4% Select High 8.4% 1.8% 25.5% 35.7%
Total 20.6% 34.3% 45.1% 100.0% Total 28.5% 24.1% 47.4% 100.0%
Efficiency Low 6.2% 26.2% 2.1% 34.6% Efficiency Low 0.0% 11.2% 2.8% 14.0%
Efficiency High 1.9% 0.0% 27.9% 29.8% Efficiency High 2.8% 0.9% 19.8% 23.5%
Total 8.2% 26.2% 30.0% 64.4% Total 2.8% 12.0% 22.7% 37.5%
Table 3. A comparison of the communication treatments with and without competition. The top
panels show the messages sent by each type of agent as well as the low-type agent’s and principal’s
choice frequencies. The top parts of the lower panels show the frequencies with which low-type and
high-type agents were selected given the message they sent. The bottom parts of the lower panels
show how much low-type and high-type agents contributed to the total percentage of efficient outcomes
given the messages they sent.
competition treatments.12 In particular, for both types of agents there is a shift from the
message they predominantly use in the absence of competition (“LD” for a low-type agent and
“HR” for a high-type agent) to the “NP” message. The rows labeled “Total” in the top panels
of Table 3 show that while the “NP” message is least used (10) without competition it is the
most frequently used message (32) with competition.
Finding 7. When competition is introduced there are fewer messages that signal the agent’s
ability.13
The preponderance of “NP” messages make it harder for the principal to select high-type agents
and may negatively affect her decision to choose “In.” We first discuss the selection issue.
In treatment “2C,” given the frequency PL(m) with which a low-type agent sends message
m, the chance that the principal is matched with a low-type agent who sent message m is
P selectL (m) =
2
3
PL(m). Similarly, the chance that the principal is matched with a high-type
agent who sent message m is P selectH (m) =
1
3
PH(m). These match or selection probabilities are
shown in the top part of the lower-left panel. Together with the “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates
they determine the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes by agent and message type14 and
12For low-type agents the difference is close to being significant with p = 0.124, for high-type agents p = 0.073,
and for the pooled messages p = 0.041 using the Fisher exact test.
13The fraction of “LD” plus “HR” messages drops from 78.7% to 56.8% when competition is introduced. This
difference is significant (p = 0.013).
14When a low-type agent sends message m, predicted efficiency is P selectL (m)p
In(m)pDR(m) and when a
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the overall fraction of efficient outcomes:
∑
m∈{NP,LD,HR}
pIn(m)
(
P selectH (m) + P
select
L (m)p
DR(m)
)
(1)
which yields 64.4% for treatment “2C,” see the bottom-left panel of Table 3.
In treatment “3C,” the principal can use the messages received to improve the chances of
selecting a high-type agent. To analyze this issue we simply record which message was selected
by the principal from each of the 37 pairs of messages received. If we order the messages (“NP”,
“LD”, “HR”) then the empirical selection frequencies can be conveniently summarized by the
following 3× 3 matrix
P select =
 0.50 0.20 0.210.80 0.50 0.29
0.79 0.71 0.50

where each entry represents the probability the row message is selected.15 Note that “better”
messages are more likely chosen: “LD” and “HR” are more frequently selected when matched
with “NP,” and from the pair (“LD”,“HR”) the “HR” message is more frequently selected.
Given the above selection probability matrix we can compute the predicted frequency with
which the principal is matched with a low or high-type agent, for each of the three message
types. The chance that a low-type agent who sent message m is selected is given by
P selectL (m) =
∑
m′ ∈{NP,LD,HR}
2
3
PL(m)
(
2
3
PL(m
′) + 1
3
PH(m
′)
)
2P select(m,m′)
where the 2 appears because there are two agents that could have sent the selected message.
Analogously, for a high-type agent the probability of being selected after sending message m is
P selectH (m) =
∑
m′ ∈{NP,LD,HR}
1
3
PH(m)
(
2
3
PL(m
′) + 1
3
PH(m
′)
)
2P select(m,m′)
These selection frequencies are shown in the bottom-right panel of Table 3. With competition
the overall frequency with which a high-type agent is selected goes up from 33.4% to 35.7%,
which is not significant.
high-type agent sends message m it is P selectH (m)p
In(m).
15For example, the second entry in the top row indicates that 20% of the time the principal selects the “NP”
message from the pair (“NP”,“LD”). The first entry in the second row shows the “LD” message is selected from
such a pair with complementary probability. More generally, summing the upper and lower part of the selection
matrix yields 1 since one of the two messages is selected. For the same reason the diagonal elements are 1/2.
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Finding 8. The possibility of communication does not improve the principal’s ability to select
the high-type agent in the competition treatment.
Besides hampering the selection process, the many “NP” messages also affect the principal’s
decision to choose “In.” Comparing the numbers in the top panels of Table 3 shows that the
“In” rate drops from 80% to 33% for the “NP” message, from 88% to 50% for the “LD” mes-
sage, and from 90% to 78% for the “HR” message.16 The overall “In” rate drops from 87.2%
in “2C” to 59.5% in “3C,” which is significant (p = 0.0035).
Finding 9. In the communication treatments, the principal chooses “In” significantly less often
when competition is introduced.
Interestingly, low-type agents that sent “LD” messages are trustworthy and never “Roll,” as in
the treatment without competition. Also, the frequency with which selected low-type agents
lie (either about their actions or types) is not significantly higher in the treatment with com-
petition.17
The selection probabilities together with the observed “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates determine
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes, see (1). These are shown in the bottom-right panel
of Table 3. In particular, the overall predicted fraction of efficient outcomes in treatment “3C”
is 37.5%.18 This is significantly lower than the corresponding percentages for treatments “3NC”
and “2C” (Findings 3 and 4). To summarize, the lower efficiency observed in the treatment
with competition and communication is because there are fewer messages that signal ability
(Finding 7). This precludes the principal from selecting a high-type agent more frequently than
the ex ante probability of 1/3 (Finding 8). In addition, the many “NP” messages cause the
principal to be more cautious and she chooses “In” less frequently (Finding 9).
4. Behavioral Explanations
4.1. Guilt Aversion
With selfish agents the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts only inefficient outcomes. The
principal chooses “Out” because there is a high chance (2/3) that choosing “In” will result in
16For the “NP” and “LD” messages these differences are significant (p = 0.04 and p = 0.03 respectively.
17The percentages of lies are 37.5% and 27.3% in treatments with and without competition respectively. The
difference is not significant (p = 0.412).
18An interesting extension is to let the principal’s “In” rate depend on both messages received. In this
case, the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes drops to 34.2% and the difference between “2C” and “3C” is
significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0475).
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a zero payoff since selfish agents choose to “Roll” independent of their type. The flip side of
this argument is that for the principal to choose “In,” low-type agents would have to choose
“Don’t Roll” sufficiently often. Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) suggest that one reason why
low-type agents might choose “Don’t Roll” is to avoid feelings of guilt associated with letting
the principal down.
There are two ways to model guilt. One version, called “simple guilt,” assumes that a low-
type agent’s guilt is proportional to the payoff loss she knows she caused. A different version,
called “guilt-from-blame,” assumes that a low-type agent’s guilt is proportional to the payoff
loss she can be blamed for by the principal. To illustrate the differences between these two guilt
theories, consider the “NDR” and “WDR” versions of no-competition treatments. According
to the simple guilt theory, the amount of guilt incurred by a low-type agent who chooses “Roll”
is the same in both versions of the game. In contrast, guilt-from-blame predicts that feelings of
guilt are less pronounced in the “WDR” version of the game, since a low-type agent cannot be
fully blamed for a zero payoff for the principal. Guilt-from-blame thus predicts higher “Don’t
Roll” rates and, in equilibrium, higher “In” rates in the “NDR” version of the game. Since we
find no differences in behavior between “NDR” and “WDR” (see Finding 2), our data are best
explained by the simple-guilt theory.
Neither guilt theory, however, can explain the positive effect of competition on efficiency
(see Finding 4) since for the selected agent in treatment “3NC” the amount of guilt is the same
as in treatment “2NC.” In addition, as noted by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), the reason
for the increased efficiency when communication is introduced in the no-competition treatment
is “outside the scope” of the simple guilt and guilt-from-blame models.
4.2. Lie Aversion
Lie aversion (Vanberg, 2008) relies more directly on the possibility of communication. The basic
idea underlying the theory is that an agent who makes a promise incurs a cost k ≥ 0 when
breaking it. In other words, lie aversion transforms cheap talk into costly talk once promises
are made. As a result, lie aversion allows for the possibility of a fully efficient equilibrium where
low-type agents promise “LD,” high-type agents promise “HR,” and the principal chooses “In”
when faced with an “LD” or “HR” message and “Out” when faced with an “NP” message.19,20
Lie aversion can thus explain the increase in efficiency when communication is introduced in
the no-competition treatment (“2C” versus “2NC”). However, it cannot explain the decrease
19For the payoffs of Figure 1, it is trivial to verify that this is an equilibrium when the cost of lying k ≥ 6.
20Of course, there is always the possibility that communication does not produce any promises (“babbling”)
in which case only the inefficient equilibrium is possible.
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in efficiency when communication is introduced in the competition treatment (“3C” versus
“3NC”), see Finding 3. Also, it cannot explain the increase in efficiency when competition is
introduced in the absence of communication (“2NC” versus “3NC”).
4.3. Inequality Aversion
When low-type agents are inequality averse they value the “Roll” option less because of the
disutility they get from being ahead in terms of payoffs. For example, according to the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) model a low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll” would be 20 − 20β
where β ≥ 0 is the inequality-aversion parameter that multiplies the difference between the
agent’s and the principal’s payoff. The low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Don’t Roll” is
simply 14. When β ≥ 0.3, agents would thus have an incentive to choose “Don’t Roll” and the
principal should choose “In.”
Now consider what happens if there is competition between agents. The selected agent now
compares her payoff to that of the principal and to that of the agent who was not selected. A
low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll” is now 20− 1
2
β(20+15) > 20−20β while the utility
from choosing “Don’t Roll” is 14− 1
2
β(9) < 14. In other words, the introduction of competition
makes the “Roll” option more attractive and the “Don’t Roll” option less attractive, resulting
in less efficient outcomes. Inequality aversion therefore predicts a reduction of efficiency due to
competition, which is the opposite of the first part of our Finding 4. Moreover, this outcome-
based theory cannot explain the effects of communication in the no-competition (“2C” versus
“2NC”) and competition treatment (“3C” versus “3NC”).
4.4. Reciprocity
Rabin’s (1993) reciprocity model is centered around the idea that kind actions trigger kind
responses while unkind actions are retaliated. For example, for the extensive-form game in
Figure 1, the principal is kind when she chooses “In” more likely and the low-type agent is kind
when she chooses “Don’t Roll” more likely. For the high-type agent, “Roll” is the unique Pareto
efficient action since it makes both the principal and the agent better off, and the high-type
agent’s choice is therefore neither kind nor unkind. The notion that kindness is reciprocated
is captured by multiplying the kindness levels of the principal and the agent and adding the
result to players’ material payoffs, weighted by a reciprocity parameter ξ ≥ 0.
The reciprocity model allows for multiple equilibria. For example, the fully inefficient out-
come in which the principal chooses “Out” and both types of agents choose “Roll” is an equilib-
rium for all levels of ξ. The reason is that the principal’s “Out” choice is unkind so a low-type
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agent will prefer to “Roll” since this yields higher material payoff and the satisfaction of retal-
iation. Similarly, the low-type agent’s “Roll” choice is unkind and the principal is better off
choosing “Out.” For high enough reciprocity levels also the fully efficient outcome in which
the principal chooses “In,” the low-type agent chooses “Don’t Roll,” and the high-type agent
chooses “Roll” is an equilibrium. Now, the principal’s choice is kind and the low-type agent
prefers to forgo material payoff and respond kindly.
The reciprocity model can thus explain a non-zero fraction of efficient outcomes in the
“2NC” treatment. Furthermore, it is the only model that predicts an increase in efficiency
when competition is introduced in the no-communication treatments. Since the payoff of not
being selected is lower than the payoff of “Out,” a low-type agent will want to reciprocate even
more when the principal selects her and chooses “In.” This results in higher “Don’t Roll” rates
and, hence, higher “In” rates. As pointed out by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), however,
the reciprocity model may have a hard time explaining the positive effects of communication.
Suppose, for example, that in treatment “2C,” a low-type agent promises not to “Roll.” If the
principal believes the promise then her “In” choice is not considered as kind as when this choice
is made in the treatment without communication.21
5. Conclusions
There are two important messages to take away from our experimental results. One con-
cerns the fragility of cheap-talk communication. We replicate recent findings by Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011) that with two people, communication is efficiency improving. However,
communication lowers efficiency in a treatment with agent competition.22 The second mes-
sage concerns the theoretical models, some of which originated to explain the positive effects
of communication in bilateral settings. We review several leading alternatives, including lie
aversion, guilt aversion, inequality aversion, and reciprocity, and find that each of them cap-
tures important aspects of the data that a model with standard preferences cannot. However,
none of the models by themselves can explain the substitute patterns between competition and
communication that we observe in the experiments.
Of course, this does not imply that the models are wrong – it is only natural to presume
that several factors are at work. It does imply, however, that more empirical work is needed
21Indeed, if the principal believes that the agent will choose “Don’t Roll” with probability one then her “In”
choice is the unique Pareto efficient action, which entails zero kindness. As a result, the low-type agent has no
incentive to keep the promise.
22Communication can be efficiency improving with more than two people if they have a common objective as
is the case, for instance, with jury decision making (Goeree and Yariv, 2011).
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to gauge the relative importance of the proposed behavioral factors. Our study is only a first
step and there are many other directions worth exploring. For instance, do communication
and competition act as substitutes in other environments? Preliminary evidence suggests that
cheap-talk works well in bilateral bargaining but not in markets with a larger number of traders
(Goeree and Zhang, 2012). Another avenue worth investigating is how the communication
protocol affects its efficacy. In this paper we considered only one-way communication from the
agent(s) to the principal. It would be interesting to explore whether two-way communication
would undo or strengthen the substitute effects of competition and communication.
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A. Appendix: Instructions (No-Competition, No-Communication Treatment)
Thank you for participating in this session. The purpose of this experiment is to study how
people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by
raising your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment.
You will receive CHF 10, as a show-up fee for participating in this session. You may
also receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon
completion of the session, this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will
ever know with whom he or she is paired.
Decision tasks
The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. In each pair, one
person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. So half of you have role A
and half of you have role B. There are 2 types for B; call these HIGH and LOW. The chance
that a B type is LOW is 2/3 and the chance that the B type is HIGH is 1/3.
The computer will roll a six-sided die and show the outcome on B’s waiting screen: if the
die comes up 1, 2, 3, or 4 then B is LOW and if the die comes up 5 or 6 then B is HIGH. Thus,
the chance that in your pair
- B is HIGH is 1/3 (33%)
- B is LOW is 2/3 (67%)
Information about B’s type is NOT known by A.
On the decision screen, each person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to choose IN
or OUT. If A chooses OUT, each of A and B receives CHF 10 (in addition to the show-up fee).
We will then convey to each B the choice made by the A with whom he or she is paired. If
A chose OUT, B has no choice to make. If A has chosen IN, B will indicate whether he or she
wishes to ROLL.
If A chooses IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, A receives CHF 14 and B receives CHF 14.
If A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL, the result depends on B’s type. If B is the LOW type
and chooses ROLL, then A receives CHF 0 and B receives CHF 20. If B is the HIGH type and
chooses ROLL, then B receives CHF 20 and the outcome of the roll of a 6-sided die determines
A’s payoff. If the die comes up 1, A receives CHF 0; if the die comes up 2-6, A receives CHF
24. (All of these amounts are in addition to the CHF 10 show-up fee.)
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 Figure A1. Screen shot of the experimental interface.
The information is summarized in the chart on the next page:
Are there any questions?
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